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Abstract
We discuss the implications of a Stackelberg sequence of play between a cartel
and the fringe. We consider two diﬀerent approaches to collusion: (i) one-stage
static model and (ii) a multi-period oligopoly model. Our main result is that in the
static model with quantity-setting ﬁrms a stable cartel only exist when cartel ﬁrms
behave as a Stackelberg leader. It is also shown that in the supergame approach the
cartel is always more easily sustained with the leadership than in the simultaneous-
moves game. The opposite result is obtained in a price-setting supergame with
diﬀerentiated products.
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11 Introduction
The analysis of cartel formation in oligopoly markets has a long tradition in the economic
literature. One of the most widely accepted structures to characterize collusive behavior
it that of a leader cartel. However, the eﬀects of the leadership assumption on cartel
success is often not discussed. We address this issue using two diﬀerent approaches to
collusion for an industry with quantity-setting ﬁrms. First, we analyze cartel stability in a
static model using the concept of cartel stability by d’Aspremont, Jacquemin, Gabszewick
and Weymark (1983) –henceforth, d’AJGW – where a cartel is stable if no ﬁrm inside
the cartel ﬁnds it desirable to exit and no ﬁrm outside the cartel ﬁn d si td e s i r a b l et o
enter. By their very nature, in a static model cartel members do not cheat on a cartel
agreement since it is assumed that agreements are sustained through binding contracts.
This may therefore, be viewed as a model of explicit or binding collusion. To the best
of our knowledge the literature on static cartel stability has assumed cartel leadership
(see for instance Donsimoni (1985), Donsimoni, Economides and Polemarchakis (1986)
or Shaﬀer (1995).1 We show that when the cartel does not behave as a leader with
respect to the fringe no cartel is stable. The intuition is that ﬁrms have incentives to exit
the cartel in order to free ride from the output reduction agreed by the cartel. On the
other hand, the supergame-theoretic approac ht oc o l l u s i o nh a sf o c u s e do nt h ep r o b l e m
of enforcement of collusive behavior (see for example the seminal paper by Friedman
(1971)). In these models, seemingly independent but parallel actions among competing
ﬁrms in an industry are driven to achieve higher proﬁts. This is termed tacit or implicit
collusion. Although the tacit collusion literature is immense, it has usually focused on
the equilibrium that maximizes industry proﬁts (see for example Rothschild (1999))2 or
to duopolies with product diﬀerentiation (see for instance Deneckere (1983), Rothschild
1Among the few exceptions that analyze the sequence of moves between a cartel and a fringe are
Shaﬀer (1995) and Prokop (1999). Both papers discuss the reasonableness of this assumption in a static
framework with homogeneous products. Their ﬁndings tend to support the assumption of a Stackelberg
cartel.
2An exception is Posada (2001) who considers exclusively the leader cartel.
2(1992) or Albæk and Lambertini (1999)). In the present paper we consider the general
case where a subset of ﬁrms are assumed to collude while the remaining ﬁrms choose
their output levels noncooperatively and compare the models with cartel leadership and
simultaneous moves. We analyze a implicit collusion model using subgame perfect Nash
equilibria –henceforth, SPNE– as solution concept and restricting strategies to grim
trigger strategies. We obtain that the leader cartel is always more easily sustained than
the cartel that simultaneously decide quantities with the fringe. Our results indicate
thus that with quantity competition cartels tend to be more successful when the cartel is
allowed to lead. The intuition is that since ﬁrms may have incentives to exit the cartel
in order to free ride from the output reduction agreed by the cartel, the relatively higher
proﬁts of the cartel attract more ﬁrms out of the fringe into the cartel as compared with
the case of simultaneous play. We prove then, that previous results on cartel stability
and cartel sustainability with quantity competition are sensitive to the assumption of
cartel leadership. We also test whether our results depend on the quantity competition
and homogeneous products assumptions. We show that regardless the degree of product
substitutability, the leader cartel is more easily sustained only when ﬁrms set quantities.
On the contrary, we obtain that if the price competition assumption seems justiﬁed, cartel
leadership hinders collusion.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we present the
model and study cartel stability in a one-stage game and cartel sustainability in a multi-
period oligopoly model. In section 3 we also consider diﬀerentiated products and price
competition. We conclude in section 4. All proofs are grouped together in the appendix.
2 The model
We consider an industry with N>2 ﬁrms, indexed by i =1 ,...,N.E a c hﬁrm produces
a quantity of a homogeneous product and for simplicity, it is assumed that the total
production cost of the ﬁrms is equal to zero. We denote by qi the output produced by
3ﬁrm i. The industry inverse demand is given by the piecewise linear function
p(Q)=m a x ( 0 ,a− Q)
where Q =
PN
i=1 qi is the industry output, p is the output price. We assume that one
cartel is formed, in such a way that K ≤ N ﬁrms –henceforth, cartel ﬁrms– behave
cooperatively so as to maximize their joint proﬁts. The remaining (N−K) ﬁrms constitute
the fringe and choose their output in a non-cooperative way.
We denote by Πc(N,K) and Πf(N,K) the proﬁt function of a cartel ﬁrm and that
of a fringe ﬁrm respectively. We analyze two diﬀerent variations of the model described
above: (i) when cartel and fringe ﬁrms simultaneously choose quantities, and (ii) when
cartel ﬁrms behave as a Stackelberg leader with respect to the fringe.
2.1 Cartel stability
In this subsection we consider a model of explicit collusion. When cartel ﬁr m sb e h a v ea s
a Stackelberg leader with respect to the fringe, the game consists of three stages. In the
ﬁrst one the ﬁrms decide independently whether or not to be part of the cartel. In the
second stage the cartel collectively sets the Stackelberg leader output, and in the third
stage, the fringe sets it output. Conversely, when cartel and fringe ﬁrms simultaneously
choose quantities we assume a two-stage game where once the cartel is formed all ﬁrms
simultaneously produce. We predict, by backward induction, the number of ﬁrms that
will join the cartel in the ﬁrst stage of the game. To that extent, we focus on the standard
stability such that no individual move is desirable. In particular, a number 0 <K≤ N
of ﬁrms join the cartel if and only if
Π
c(N,K) ≥ Π




c(N,K +1 ) . (2)
4We note that these conditions are equivalent to the stability concept proposed by
d’AJGW where no individual move is desirable and where ﬁrms hypothesize that no
other ﬁrm will change its strategy concerning its membership in the cartel.3 Apart from
the degenerate case of K =1 , a cartel can be deﬁn e da si n t e r n a l l ys t a b l ei fi ti sn o t
proﬁtable for a cartel member to defect to the fringe (condition (1)). Likewise, apart
from the degenerate case of K = N,.a cartel is said to be externally stable if it is not
proﬁtable for a fringe ﬁrm to join the cartel (condition (2)).
Deﬁnition 1 Ac a r t e li ss a i dt ob es t a b l ei fi ti sb o t hi n t e r n a l l ya n de x t e r n a l l ys t a b l e .
We can now state the following Proposition proved in the appendix.
Proposition 1 When all ﬁrms simultaneously choose quantities, no cartel is stable. When
the cartel behaves as a Stackelberg leader with respect to the fringe, a stable cartels exists
if N ≥ 4 and if K ∈ [f(N),f(N)+1 ]where f(N)=1
4(1 + 3N −
2 p
(N − 2)N − 7).I f
N<4 the unique stable cartel is joint monopoly.
When all ﬁrms simultaneously choose quantities, no cartel is stable because ﬁrms
inside the cartel ﬁnd it desirable to exit.4 By contrast, a stable leader cartel contains just
over half the ﬁrms in the industry since with the leadership, the relatively higher proﬁts
of the cartel attract more ﬁrms out of the fringe into the cartel as compared with the case
of simultaneous play.
2.2 Cartel sustainability
In this subsection we consider an industry where ﬁrms play an inﬁnitely repeated oligopolis-
tic game. We assume that cartel ﬁrms collude in quantities over an inﬁnite time horizon
3Thoron (1998) proves the correspondence between this stability concept and the Nash equilibria.
4We remark also the similarity with the result in Salant et al. (1983) that, with simultaneous play,
mergers are generally not proﬁtable. As in the cartel case, unproﬁtability comes from the fact that non-
participant ﬁrms react to the merger (or cartel) by increasing their output. However, mergers can still
be proﬁtable if a suﬃciently large number of ﬁrms are involved in the merger since the free-rider problem
is alleviated by the reduction in the number of ﬁrms.
5with complete information (i.e. each of the ﬁrms either fringe or cartel observes the whole
history of actions) and discount the future using a discount factor δ ∈ (0,1).A s i n
the previous subsection we consider two diﬀerent cases (i) all ﬁrms simultaneously choose
quantities and (ii) in every period the cartel anticipates the fringe and behaves as a Stack-
elberg leader with respect to the fringe. For simplicity, we restrict our attention to the
case where each cartel ﬁrm is only allowed to follow grim trigger strategies, i.e., after any
deviation at time t cartel ﬁrms revert to the relevant one-shot Nash equilibrium strategy.
Regarding fringe ﬁrms, their optimal response consists of maximizing their current pe-
riod’s payoﬀ. As shown by Friedman (1971), cartel ﬁrms colluding in each period can be
sustained as a SPNE of the repeated game if and only if for given values of N,K and δ,








where Πch(N,K) denotes the proﬁts attained by an optimal deviation from the collusive
output, and Π(N) denotes the Nash equilibrium proﬁts. Evaluating condition (3) in terms
of the return rate r ≡ 1−δ
δ results in r ≤ r∗ ≡
Πc(N,K) − Π(N)
Πch(N,K) − Πc(N,K)
which is the critical
value below which a cartel member does not have incentives to deviate. Therefore, r∗ can
be seen as a measure of the cartel sustainability. An easy comparison reveals the following
result.
Proposition 2 The leader cartel is always more easily sustained than the cartel that
simultaneously decide quantities with the fringe.
In other words, it seems more plausible that a collusive quantity-setting industry is
characterized by a cartel leadership. Intuitively, cartel proﬁts are higher with leadership
and furthermore the gains from chiseling are higher in the simultaneous decision game.
Consequently, the game with cartel leadership is more eﬀective in enforcing an agreement.
63E x t e n s i o n s
In this section we test whether our results hinge on the assumption of quantity compe-
tition and homogeneous products by considering also diﬀerentiated products and price
competition. To that extent, we assume that the industry produces non-spatial horizon-
tally diﬀerentiated products such that the degree of diﬀerentiation between the products
of any two ﬁrms is the same. Thus, the inverse demand function exhibits a Chamberlinian
symmetry:




where pi denotes the price of good i and qj the quantity sold of good j.A l t e r n a t i v e l y ,w e
can write the demand system as




where α = a
1+(N−1)b,β =
1+(N−2)b
(1−b)(1+(N−1)b) and γ = b
(1−b)(1+(N−1)b).It is assumed a,b > 0
and 0 ≤ b ≤ 1. The value range for b (the common degree of product substitutability)
implies that the products are viewed as substitutes rather than complements and that
the price of each product is more susceptible to changes on its own demand rather than
changes on other product demand. When products are diﬀerentiated, the computation of
cartel stability is intractable. However, numerical simulations can be conducted. We oﬀer
examples to analyze whether the results of the previous section regarding cartel stability
extend to the heterogenous products case. The following tables show the unique stable
cartel (K) for diﬀerent values of N and b in four cases: quantity and price competition
with leadership and simultaneous decision.
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These tables indicate that with quantity competition the stable cartel always exists only
when the cartel behaves as a Stackelberg leader. The reverse is true when ﬁrms compete
in prices. It seems thus reasonable to suppose that the intuition behind Proposition
1e x t e n d st ot h ed i ﬀerentiated products case when ﬁrms compete in quantities and is
reversed when ﬁrms compete in prices.
We can also analyze cartel sustainability extending the analysis of subsection 2.2 to
price competition and diﬀerentiated products. Its is a standard exercise to obtain the criti-
cal values below which a cartel member does not have incentives to deviate in four diﬀerent
settings: a Cournot supergame where ﬁrms set quantities or a Bertrand supergame where
they choose prices with cartel leadership or simultaneous decision between the cartel and
the fringe.
8Proposition 3 In a Cournot supergame with diﬀerentiated products, the leader cartel is
always more easily sustained than the cartel that simultaneously decide quantities with the
fringe. In a Bertrand supergame with diﬀerentiated products, the leader cartel is always
less easily sustained than the cartel that simultaneously decide prices with the fringe.
Therefore, Proposition 2 carries over to a model with diﬀerentiated products. However,
the implications on cartel sustainability derived in Proposition 2 do not carry over when
ﬁrms compete in prices. This diﬀerence follows from the fact that reaction functions
are upward sloping in price games but downward sloping in quantity games. With cartel
leadership, the reaction of fringe ﬁrms reinforces the initial price increase that results from
the cartel price and therefore the intuitions provided in the previous section are reversed
when ﬁrms compete in prices.
4 Concluding comments
We have developed a theoretical framework to study how the sequence of play between
t h ec a r t e la n dt h ef r i n g ea ﬀects cartel stability and cartel sustainability. We show that
using a standard stability concept, with quantity competition no cartel is stable unless
the cartel is allowed to lead. Regarding cartel sustainability in a repeated game, we prove
that cartel leadership only facilitates tacit collusion in a Cournot supergame where ﬁrms
set quantities. Our ﬁndings suggest then that in a cartelistic industry, the Stackelberg
model is more plausible than the simultaneous-move model if ﬁrms set quantities. Con-
versely, when ﬁrms choose prices cartel leadership hinders collusion. Therefore, antitrust
authorities may be extremely wary to consider cartel leadership as a factor that facilitates
collusion.
We note also that cooperation within a cartel is similar to the outcome of horizontal
mergers in the absence of synergies, although unlike a cartel, a merger usually reduces the
number of ﬁrms in the industry. Therefore, the present paper presents a contrasting result
to the analysis of exogenous Cournot mergers in Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983), and
9conﬁrms that the endogenization of the merger decision depends also on the sequence of
moves within the ﬁrms.
The framework we have worked with is, admittedly, a particular one. To analyze real-
world cases of cartels, ﬁrms’ capacities or cost asymmetries should also be considered.
Other natural questions are also which is the appropriate endogenous sequence of play
between the cartel and the fringe and how the cartel could be able to impose its most
preferred timing in a cartelistic model. We believe that those are subjects for future
research.
Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . W h e nﬁrms simultaneously choose quantities it can be easily
proved that
Πc(N,K)= a2
K(N−K+2)2 and Πf(N,K)= a2
(N−K+1)2 It is immediate to see that internal
stability holds if Πc(N,K) ≥ Πf(N,K − 1) =⇒ 1
K(N−K+2)2 − 1
(N−K)2 ≥ 0 which is true if
N ∈ [−2 − 2
1+
√
K + K,−2+ 2
1+
√
K + K] but this cannot hold if K ≤ N. When the cartel
b e h a v e sa saS t a c k e l b e r gl e a d e rΠc(N,K)= a2
4K(N−K+1) and Πf(N,K)= a2
4(N−K+1)2.I tc a n





4(1+K)(K−N)(1−K+N)2 ≥ 0 respectively. If N<4 external stability is never met
unless K = N. In the later case, internal stability holds if N ≤ 4. If N ≥ 4 internal




(N − 2)N − 7+5













(N − 2)N − 7) = 1, stable cartel exists only when both conditions hold and
that is for K ∈ [f(N),f(N)+1 ]where f(N)=1
4(1 + 3N −
p
(N − 2)N − 7).
Proof of Proposition 2. It is easy to prove that the return rate deﬁned in subsection 2.2






(1+N)2 where subscripts S and
L indicate respectively whether cartel and fringe ﬁrms simultaneously choose quantities





10Proof of Proposition 3. It is a straightforward exercise to calculate the return rates.
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(b−2)(K−1)(2+b(N−1)) < 0. We note that rB
S ,rB
L are valid only for the case where K<N
since otherwise when the cheating member deviates, the remaining demand of the cartel
members may become negative. In this case the cheating ﬁrm maximizes its proﬁts by
reducing its price until the demand of the remaining cartel members is equal to zero.
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